

Temporary Conditions

The Threat to Quality Jobs and Services
in Riverside County



Temporary Conditions

The Threat to Quality Jobs and Services in Riverside County

Authored by
Dr. Murtaza H. Baxamusa, AICP, Ph.D.
Director of Research and Policy
Center on Policy Initiatives

March 2008



Table of Contents

- Executive Summary..... 1
- Findings..... 2
- Recommendations..... 3
- 1. Riverside County: A Growing Place 4
- 2. Riverside County: Budgeting a Living..... 5
- 3. Riverside County: Job Quality and Growth 7
- 4. Decade in Review: Temporary Services..... 8
- 5. Riverside County: The Employer 9
- 6. Riverside County: Service Provider 11
- 7. Findings from Temporary Employee Studies & Surveys 13
- 8. Factoring the Multiplier Effect..... 15
- 9. A Multiplying Factor: Home Ownership 16
- 10. A Dividing Factor: Taxpayer Healthcare Subsidy 18
- 11. Recommendations: Creating Quality Jobs 19
- Appendix A: Inland Empire Employment by Sector 2006-07..... 21
- Endnotes..... 22

Executive Summary

California's economy often has been measured as if it were an independent nation, and its size and power rank it among the 10 largest economies in the world.¹ After the State itself, 58 county governments are the largest public bodies responsible for Californians, and Riverside County is the fastest growing and fourth largest county in California.

The word "county" has at least three meanings: a place where people live, a direct service provider to those residents, and an employer of the people who produce and also consume county services. Often the largest employer in an area, county governments have a unique ability to shape regional quality of life with their employment practices and lead other local employers in raising job quality standards.

This study focuses on temporary employment in Riverside County. Since 1990, the Riverside temporary help industry has grown by 454%, compared to general industry growth of 92%. The county government is the largest employer in the Inland Empire, a region of 4 million people that includes Riverside and San Bernardino counties. The number of "temps" employed directly by Riverside County has increased from 2% to 10% of the total workforce, double the rate in its peer counties.

The County has the opportunity to leverage its size as an employer to create family-sustaining jobs, increasing the chances of economic security for residents, who are also goods consumers in the local economy. Unchecked expansion of temporary employees undermines that opportunity, as well as the quality level of public services. Temporary workers are paid less than permanent workers with the same qualifications doing the same job, and they don't receive health benefits, Social Security, sick leave or vacation time. Temporary job assignments may end abruptly, severing the continuity necessary for quality services such as medical care and legal advice.

Riverside County established its "Temporary Assistant Pool" (TAP) in 1998, both to circumvent a State rule limiting contracts with temporary employees to 90 days and to save \$.90 per employee hour by not paying fees to outside agencies. Later this initial "pool" was institutionalized as the "Temporary Assignment Program."

Locally, the County has faced criticism of its use of temporary employees. Three Grand Jury investigations conducted since 2003 found merit in citizen complaints related to temporary employee overuse impacting quality services.

Our case study uses those reports in addition to research on employment data, home ownership and job growth. Sources include Inland Empire economist John Husing, academic studies, surveys of temporary employees from 2001 and 2007, and findings from CPI's four previous reports on temporary employment.

While there are legitimate needs for temporary help in some situations, the County undermines its own mission if it replaces permanent work with temporary employees. Riverside's use of temporary workers has statewide implications for the public sector. Counties can avoid the 90-day restriction and hire "in-house" temporary employees with no time limitation and little public transparency as to the loss of permanent public service jobs. This case study of temporary employment in the public sector shows a need for new regulation, both to strengthen California's economy and to ensure quality services.

Findings

Our findings show an overabundance of temporary employees undermines the County's leverage to create family-sustaining jobs in the region and threatens the County's public sector mission of delivering quality services.

Growing Lower-Wage Jobs

Riverside County, as an employer, is the single largest job engine in the County. It hires temporary employees at double the rate of similarly-sized neighboring counties, San Bernardino, Orange, and San Diego.

Riverside County temporary employees make 5.5% less than regular employee wages for the same positions. \$11.30 per hour was the median wage for temporary workers employed by Riverside County in November 2007. That wage does not pay either single adults or parents enough to afford healthcare and stay off public assistance. In the Inland Empire, a single adult needs to make \$15 per hour, and parents from \$17.50 to \$29 per hour, depending on the number of working adults.

Since beginning an in-house temporary worker pool in 1998, Riverside County has increased its population of temporary employees from 2% to 10% of its workforce. Among the Inland Empire's top 10 fastest growing job sectors in 2006-2007, six were low-wage sectors, three moderate-wage and only one high-wage. With the second highest percentage increase in the Inland Empire, Employment Services increased by 5.7% from 2006 to 2007. Private sector temporary jobs in Riverside County grew by 454% compared to overall job growth of 92%, between 1990 and 2006.

Negative Impacts to Job Quality

Two-thirds of surveyed temporary employees employed by Riverside County had no health coverage at all in 2007, not even through a spouse. Taxpayers subsidize employers who do not provide employee health insurance. In 2006, uncompensated care at the Riverside County Regional Medical Center cost \$10.6 million, an increase of 86% from 2005.

Riverside County temporary workers do not receive employer-paid healthcare coverage, vacation or sick day accrual, or employer payment of Social Security.

Negative Impacts to Quality Services

Riverside County has undergone three Grand Jury investigations in the last four years that all found an overuse of temporary employees has negatively impacted service quality. High turnover rates, lack of care consistency in health divisions, lack of transparency, and nepotism in hiring all were issues raised related to temporary employment, originating with citizen complaints. Refusal of an independent audit of the Temporary Assignment Program (founded as the "Temporary Assistant Pool") in 2004 was followed by Grand Jury complaints in 2005 and 2006 about service quality.

Surveys Show Negative Impacts

Two surveys of temporary employees in Riverside County, one in 2001 and the other in 2007, show similar patterns. The majority of surveyed temporary workers are “involuntary.” In 2001, 75% of those surveyed would have preferred regular work, and in 2007, it had risen to 86%.

The 2007 survey showed that 23% of temporary employees were African-American, while African Americans made up only 6% of the County population. In national Census data, 12% of the temporary workforce was African-American, and 7% of the total employed population. Asian Americans also had disproportionate temporary employment in the 2007 Riverside survey. They were 4% of the total population and 10% of the County temporary employees.

Women were 44% of the workforce population, but 76% of Riverside’s temporary employee universe in 2007. Nationally, women made up 40% of the total workforce and 57% of temporary employees.

Threat to Homeownership and Civic Participation

Security and longevity in a community makes for a more engaged public, and homeownership increases length of residency. An analysis of the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth studying 12,686 baby boomers shows a minority of temporary employees became homeowners.


As of August, 2007, a Riverside median-priced home was \$390,000. The annual income needed to buy this home was \$94,910. Assuming two earners per household, each making the same amount, 12.6% of the County temporary employee households could afford to buy a median-priced home. Only the top 6.5% of the County’s TAP employees could afford the median-priced home on their wages alone.

Recommendations

- 1. Right to Know: State Audit of County Use of Temporary Employees.** The State should conduct an audit of the in-house temporary agency created by Riverside County to circumvent the 90-day temporary hire rule. Taxpayers have a right to know how many temporary workers are employed by a public agency.
- 2. Define Parameters of Temporary Employment.** Legislation is needed to clarify the use of temporary workers by local governments and to close loopholes permitting hiring of temps for jobs that could be performed by permanent employees.
- 3. Ensure Nondiscrimination: Regularly Disclose Gender and Racial Patterns in Temporary Hiring.** The State Audit should include an examination of race and gender disparity in temporary hiring, and whether it affects workers’ chances of becoming permanent employees.
- 4. Re-examine Job Growth Sectors.** Riverside and San Bernardino Counties should revisit their economic development strategy to avoid concentrated growth in low-wage industries.
- 5. Respect the Right to Collective Bargaining.** Temporary workers deserve the opportunity to bargain collectively with their employers. Public agencies, including Riverside County, should support this crucial right and not spend taxpayer dollars on efforts to deny temporary workers the opportunity to collectively bargain.

1. Riverside County: A Growing Place

As the fourth largest and fastest growing county in California, Riverside plays a major role in a regional Southern California economy, though socio-economic tensions have resulted from a new migration into the County from other parts of the State.



The fourth largest county in California, Riverside County includes 24 incorporated cities. In the last 16 years, most of the County had above average population growth. The County administration states: “Our County is growing by leaps and bounds, forging an identity of its own as we emerge from the shadows of our better-known neighbors in Los Angeles and Orange Counties.”²

Riverside’s growth shows the interconnectedness of Southern California. The 2000 census showed Riverside job centers drawing daily commuters from other counties: 52,016 from San Bernardino County, 36,802 from Los Angeles County, 18,641 from San Diego County, and 11,451 from Orange County. Twenty-three percent, or nearly 170,000 people, commuted outside of the County to work: 60,412 to San Bernardino County, 51,609 to Orange, County 9,293 to Los Angeles County, and 5,882 to San Diego County.³

With the demands of commuting and high coastal home prices, a new wave of migrants has come in the last decade to Riverside from within California. UC Riverside Professor Karthick Ramakrishnan notes demographic changes arriving with this growth:

“The Inland Empire is growing in its racial and ethnic diversity, with whites and Latinos accounting for roughly equal proportions of the population at around 40% and African Americans at around 8% and Asian Americans at 5%.”⁴

Ramakrishnan also points to a shift away from traditional Republican registration, and higher proportion of Independent voters. A Fontana native, author Mike Davis comments on new socio-economic tensions: “there is a populist element in the Inland Empire that bitterly resents the partial gentrification of once happy badlands.” Interviewing the current occupant of his childhood home, he hears, “This used to be a good neighborhood...Now, there’s goddamn yuppies everywhere.”⁵

2. Riverside County: Budgeting a Living

The California Budget Project calculates a basic needs budget for the Inland Empire. The budget presents how much income a person or family needs to generate in order to make that basic budget and stay off tax-payer funded, public assistance.

“Native” resentment against new residents has roots in anxiety about displacement, as the economy has gotten worse. The California Budget Project has calculated a “basic family needs budget” for the State and its specific regions.⁶ In line item costs, it provides a common sense definition of what families “need to earn in order to achieve a modest standard of living without assistance from public programs.”⁷ In 2007, Inland Empire’s basic family needs budget, assuming a family with two children, an infant and toddler, was as follows:

Inland Empire Basic Family Needs Budget

	Single Adult	Single Parent Family	Two Parents One Working	Two Parents Both Working
Housing/Utilities	\$925 36.7%	\$1,224 24.5%	\$1,224 28.8%	\$1,224 20.2%
Child Care	\$0 0%	\$1,046 21.0%	\$0 0%	\$1,046 17.3%
Transportation	\$446 17.7%	\$446 8.9%	\$446 10.5%	\$814 13.45%
Food	\$211 8.4%	\$507 10.2%	\$731 17.2%	\$731 12.1%
Health Care	\$231 9.2%	\$648 13.0%	\$853 20.1%	\$853 14.1%
Misc.	\$206 8.2%	\$437 8.8%	\$506 11.9%	\$506 8.4%
Taxes	\$503 19.9%	\$683 13.7%	\$482 11.4%	\$884 14.6%
Monthly total	\$2,522	\$4,990	\$4,242	\$6,058
Annual Total	\$30,262	\$59,875	\$50,905	\$72,696

Source: California Budget Project 2007

These wages clearly are well above the current California minimum wage of \$8.00 per hour, which gives an employee an annual salary of \$16,640, with the same assumption of a 40-hour week/52-week year payroll used to calculate the Basic Family Needs Budget. The basic needs budget assumes that the family bears the cost of health coverage, when employers do not offer this paid benefit.

While many individuals and families do live on less than the basic budgets described here, many must rely on taxpayer-subsidized public assistance programs. As of the last Census, more than 40,000 Riverside County families lived under the federal poverty line—almost 11 percent of all families.⁸ This percentage rises dramatically for families with younger children. Twenty percent of families with children under age 5 live below the poverty line. The number is only slightly better for families with children 18 and under; 18 percent live below the poverty line.⁹

Families in this situation will cut preventive health care altogether for adults, relying instead on taxpayer-subsidized indigent emergency care, and use the taxpayer-funded Healthy Families system for their children. Miscellaneous expenses such as caring for elderly parents, saving for a child's higher education, personal retirement savings, vacations, or emergency savings are likely to face a personal budget axe for those not making enough to get by, making upward mobility an unlikely possibility.


3. Riverside County: Job Quality and Growth

While the Inland Empire has expected large growth in high-wage industry sectors, six out of the ten fastest growing industries in 2006-2007 were in lower-wage sectors. Employment Services (temporary jobs) ranked second in fastest growth, a 5.7% increase, adding 2,900 new temporary jobs.

As the population has grown, so has employment. Inland Empire economist John Husing notes that the region provided 1 in 3 of new California jobs from 2006 to 2007.¹⁰ “The area’s job growth was almost five times the 10,500 jobs added in San Diego (8,800) and Orange (1,700) counties.”¹¹ For 2007 as a whole, an average of 863,867 civilians in Riverside County was employed, while unemployment averaged 5.9%.¹²

But what kind of jobs are growing most quickly in the fertile Inland Empire? Do they support a basic family needs budget? The data says no.

John Husing in his 2007 forecast expressed “economic concern,” predicting job growth in lower-paying sectors. His January 2008 *Inland Empire Quarterly Report* shows there was good reason for that concern. Of the top 10 sectors with highest-percentage growth six were Low Wage, and only one High Wage. The top two fastest-growing sectors for 2006-2007 were “Amusement” — primarily casino jobs — which grew by 8.2%, and “Employment Agency” — private sector temporary jobs — which grew by 5.7%.¹³ (See Appendix A for Husing’s full list.)



Neither of these sectors figure in plans for regional job growth articulated in the long term Inland Empire occupational forecast for 2004-2014, generated with the California Economic Development Department. High paying jobs were to have the fastest growth, with Computer Software and Application Engineers at the top of the list.¹⁴ Husing recently advised that “over time, Riverside County must strive to have more job growth in basic sectors above its \$33,625 county-wide average.”¹⁵ The County and its residents do not separately face recent downward economic pressures; they are interconnected. Continuing to grow lower-paid industry sectors will not make the County or its residents more secure.

4. Decade in Review: Temporary Services

In earlier work on the temporary industry, CPI observed that temporary services in the private sector exploded in an economic boom time, rather than a recession, marking an ongoing structural change in the way we work.


In our 2001 *Working on the Margins: California's Growing Temporary Workforce*, we tracked state and federal data to log California's explosive Employment Agency industry growth between 1990 and 1998. During that period, the number of temporary jobs grew in all regions of California, increasing in most counties over 100%, including Riverside County.¹⁶

Surprisingly, temporary employment growth statewide and in Riverside remained flat during the recessions of 1998-1999 and 2000-2001, while they grew dramatically during the booms.

The recession pattern ran counter to our expectations that the uncertain economic climate would have spurred the creation of temporary jobs. The surprise tells us something else: that the share of temporary jobs was not simply dependent on the business cycle. Rather it became part of an ongoing structural change in the way we work. These changes include the outsourcing of large sectors of American jobs, and the new dominance of the service sector in the U.S. economy.¹⁷

From 1990 to 2006, The Employment Services industry in the Inland Empire — Riverside and San Bernardino counties — averaged an annual growth of 32% per year.¹⁸ Riverside County saw a 454% total increase in the “temporary help services” industry,¹⁹ compared to 92% employment growth in all industries. Thus temporary jobs grew more than four times faster than job growth in all other Riverside industries. This growth actually underestimates the region's volume of temporary work, because public agency direct hires of temporaries are counted separately, in local government employment data.

Temporary jobs grew more than four times faster than job growth in all other Riverside industries from 1990-2006.



5. Riverside County: The Employer

As the region's largest employer, Riverside County creates thousands of family-sustaining jobs. However, it created the Temporary Assignment Pool (TAP) in part so it could keep temporary employees beyond a 90-day limit mandated by state law. Riverside County uses twice as many temporary employees as neighboring counties of similar size.

Riverside County plays a central role as the largest employer in the regional economy. The County has the opportunity to leverage its size as an employer to create family-sustaining jobs, increasing chances of economic security for residents, who are also goods consumers in the local economy. An unchecked expansion of temporary employees threatens that opportunity.

Public employers dominate the Inland Empire economy. Eleven of the largest Inland Empire employers are in the public sector, with just 7 in the private sector.²⁰

Inland Empire's Largest Employers by County 2007

Employer	Sector	County	# Employees	County Employment %
County of Riverside	Public	Riverside	19,669	2.27%
County of San Bernardino	Public	San Bernardino	18,382	2.13%
Stater Brothers	Private	Both	13,725	Not Applicable
Loma Linda University Adventist Health Services	Private	San Bernardino	13,000	1.51%
Kaiser Permanente	Private	Both	8,882	Not Applicable
March Air Reserve Base	Public	Riverside	8,750	1.01%
San Bernardino City Unified School Dist.	Public	San Bernardino	8,574	0.99%
Ontario International Airport	Public	San Bernardino	7,510	0.87%
UC Riverside	Public	Riverside	6,657	0.77%
Riverside Unified School District	Public	Riverside	5,099	0.59%
Pechanga Resort & Casino	Private	Riverside	4,800	0.55%
Guidant Corp.	Private	Riverside	4,500	0.52%
Fontana Unified School District	Public	San Bernardino	3,953	0.46%
Riverside Community College District	Public	Riverside	3,753	0.43%
San Manuel Band of Mission Indians	Private	San Bernardino	3,261	0.38%
Chino Valley Unified School District	Public	San Bernardino	3,200	0.37%
California State University San Bernardino	Public	San Bernardino	3,012	0.35%
Morongio Casino Resort & Spa	Private	Riverside	3,000	0.35%

Sources: Riverside County 2007 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report; San Bernardino County 2007 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report.²³

The Department of Human Resources advertises the County's #1 rank on a website titled "Welcome to Riverside:"

"The County of Riverside is the area's largest employer, with 15,600²⁴ permanent full-time employees and 1,850 temporary and per-diem employees. County employees enjoy a full range of packaged benefit options, including medical, dental, vision and more.²⁵"

Permanent employees do have good jobs with the County. In addition to healthcare coverage, these benefit options typically include a regular wage increase, a defined pension contribution, and an optional deferred compensation in either a 457(b) or 401(a). Stability in scheduling, predictable wage increases, paid holidays and sick leave mean that working for the County is a family-sustaining job for many.

However, temporary employees working for the County do not have the same experience. Based on Human Resource's advertised numbers, one of every nine County employees (or 11%) are now classified as temporaries. These employees do not "enjoy" the good benefits advertised by Human Resources: no medical, dental, vision, paid sick leave, vacation days, or retirement accrual; even if a long term "temp" goes "perm," the County does not count time as a temporary toward benefits.

The County authorized its Personnel Department to create a new program called the "Temporary Assistance Pool" in 1998. The pool was to fill "immediate staff need for a limited period of time. This need may be generated by seasonal/peak work loads, temporary absence of regular staff, emergency conditions, etc."²⁶ Eliminating fees to third-party agencies and paying the TAP employees 5.5% less than regular employees were to result in an estimated savings of \$.90 per employee per hour.²⁷

While there is no question that the County has a legitimate need for short-term help, the TAP program was explicitly proposed as a way to avoid the State's 90-day limit on contracting temporaries.

The Auditor Controller wrote that TAP's "most obvious benefit is the elimination of the 90 day limit."²⁸ The Personnel Department's report to the Board of Supervisors also shows it explicitly designed the program to extend use of temps beyond 90 days. Departments had been interpreting Government Code 31000.4 as limiting "temporary service usage to a ninety (90) day period for any single peak load, temporary absence, or emergency situation. Such compliance with this limitation has resulted in a fifty percent decrease in the use of temporary services"²⁹

Ironically, Personnel also stated that part of TAP's rationale was to "Track Temporary Services employees to ensure compliance with the 90 day Government Code limitation."³⁰

Human Resources hires TAP workers as requested by departments.³¹ The TAP program also manages the bulk of "per diem" employees, who are concentrated in hospitals. In addition, about 16% of the County's temporary employees are hired directly by departments.³² Finally, the hospitals, in particular, are still dependent on private employment agencies, particularly for nurses.³³

Today, Riverside County, as an employer, uses temporary workers at double the rate of neighboring counties of similar size.³⁴

County	# of Temporary Employees	Total	Temps as a % of Total	2006 Population*
San Diego	790	16,412	5%	2,941,000
Orange	1,158	21,800	5%	3,002,000
San Bernardino	850	18,386	5%	1,999,000
Riverside	2,100	21,000	10%	2,028,000

*Estimate, US Census, State & County Quickfacts

6. Riverside County: Service Provider

Three Grand Jury investigations conducted from 2003 to 2007 directly connect overuse of temporaries to negative impacts on service quality. Public records show the volume of temporary employees in five departments with service problems.

County employees deliver services in multiple arenas, from recording marriages, births and deaths to providing legal defense, child protective services, and hospital care, among a long list. Assigning temporary employees to fill a permanent need affects these services.

TAP. A 2003-2004 Grand Jury investigation focused on the TAP program itself, finding that the program had a 500% funding increase since 1998, needed an independent audit, and contributed to a high turnover rate that cost the County \$1,140 per employee or \$11 million dollars. The investigation also found evidence of nepotism in hiring, and that the County intimidated employees interviewed during the Grand Jury process.

While the Personnel Department rebutted charges and modified a few practices, the County did not pursue an independent audit of TAP practices as was recommended by the Grand Jury.

Mental Health. The Mental Health Department provides counseling and psychiatric care for residents experiencing emotional distress or mental illness. As of November 2007, 60 temporary employees worked the equivalent of more than 33 full-time positions in the department.³⁵ A 2005-2006 Grand Jury report describes high turnover, low staff morale, and questionable safety practices. The department's response acknowledges many of the problems and points out that the department used TAP "replacement" staff.³⁶

Public Defender. Charged with representing clients who cannot afford outside legal counsel, the Public Defender's Office maintains equal treatment the checks and balances of the US legal system. As of November 2007, eight temporary employees worked the equivalent of eight full-time public defender positions. According to the *Riverside Press Enterprise*, an internal audit reported 19-22% turnover in 2006, costing the County approximately \$700,000 in 2006. Citing the report, the article states that this figure "does not capture costs of low productivity and morale or poor performance related to vacancies..."³⁷

Department of Public Social Services (DPSS). This department has the job of protecting people who cannot protect themselves: children, the elderly, and those in extreme financial distress. The department runs foster care and child and adult protective services, among other responsibilities. As of November 2007, the department had 170 temporary employees working the equivalent of 116 full-time positions.

The high volume of temporary hires reflects a turnover problem which temporary employees cannot solve. A 2004 report found "chronic and persistent challenges with social worker recruitment and retention, especially in the desert regions, which impact the ability to provide quality services."³⁸

*The Grand Jury
found "an absence of
continuity of care."*

Riverside County Regional Medical Center (RCRMC). This public healthcare system serves Riverside County residents, with a mission of fostering “an atmosphere of superior quality patient care and first-rate service.”³⁹ As of November 2007, 550 temporary employees worked the equivalent of more than 400 full-time positions at RCRMC.

A 2006-2007 Grand Jury report directly connects the “high utilization of registry personnel . . . to a lack of continuum of care, poor documentation and an increased burden to the regular staff, therefore, a greater cost to the facility.” In a related finding, the same report identifies the “the extensive use of per diem psychiatrist/physicians” as the reason for “an absence of continuity of care.”⁴⁰

The Department’s response indicates that a long-standing policy of hiring doctors on a per diem basis was changed in 2006. It also notes that there are still “long term employed Per Diem psychiatrists who work the equivalent of full-time. . .” A number of other findings are disputed by referencing a JCAHO study, the contents of which are not cited nor is the report itself attached.⁴¹

The Grand Jury report also includes indirect indicators of costs created by overreliance on temporary employees:

- “Insufficient staff coverage on the night shift violates the 4-to-1 and 5-to-1 patient/nurse ratios and has created an unsafe environment. . .”
- “Training records. . . were found incomplete, disorganized, and not useful. . .”
- “. . . leaving funded staff positions unfilled.”
- “. . . not reducing the high turnover. . .”
- “. . . affected employee morale.”⁴²

These examples from County public records illustrate more hidden costs of understaffing permanent positions by long-term use of temporary employees. While dollar values are not assigned, the costs to public service are clear.

7. Findings from Temporary Employee Studies & Surveys

87% of surveyed Riverside County temporary employees are “involuntary,” and would prefer a permanent job. Two-thirds had no health insurance. Census and survey data show disproportionate employment of African Americans and women in temporary work.

A 2007 survey of temporary employees working for Riverside County was conducted by paid surveyors who spoke with 581 of the 2,100 temporary employees, representing over 25% of the temporary workforce.⁴³ As the County covers a vast geographic area, conversations occurred both in the more concentrated worksites, such as the Riverside County Regional Medical Center in Moreno Valley, as well as in eastern desert locations that employ fewer workers.

The survey deployed the “snowballing” method, meeting employees interested in participating, who then introduce the surveyor to other employees. This method can result in statistical over-representation of certain worksite departments. However, the majority of respondents were office assistants, who make up the majority of TAP employees. Among those surveyed, 325 employees identified themselves as hired by the TAP program, 39 said they were per diem, and the remaining 217 did not identify the program through which they were hired.

85% said they did the same work as permanent employees. 87% said they “would prefer to be permanent.”

Many of the results are consistent with earlier findings on private sector temporary workers from our 2002 publication, *Just Getting By: The Experience of Temporary Employees in San Diego’s Economy*. That study examined Bureau of Labor Statistics data, temporary employee focus group responses, and interviews with temporary agency managers.

Where They Live. 500 of the 581 respondents stated they lived in Riverside County. Of those, 131 live in the City of Riverside, 130 in Moreno Valley, 44 in Perris, 30 in Hemet, 23 in Corona, and the remaining respondents in 46 other areas, mostly in the Inland Empire. Two employees from Victorville had the longest commute.⁴⁴

Assignment Duration. A statewide study we completed in 2001, *Working on the Margins*, found a 6-month median tenure among temporary workers (page 18). Almost 25% had worked as temps for more than a year, while 35% had been on their current assignments for less than 3 months.

Of those surveyed in Riverside during 2007, approximately one-third had worked more than a year for the County, and 76% reported that they worked full-time, 40 hours or more. Thirty-seven percent had been on their current assignments for less than 3 months. A large majority, 85%, responded “yes” to a question asking if they did the same kind of work as permanent employees.

Voluntary versus Involuntary. Objective discussion of employee responses acknowledges a key difference between Voluntary Temporaries, those who choose and prefer temporary work, and Involuntary Temporaries, those who would prefer a permanent position if it were available. In our 2002 San Diego survey, 25% were voluntary, 75% involuntary. In the 2007 Riverside survey, 11% were voluntary while 87% were involuntary, saying they “would prefer to be permanent.”

Benefit difference. The lack of paid sick leave has implications for the employees, their families, co-workers, and the public. Barbara Robinson, President of Bank of America Inland Empire Market, has stated:

Many low- to moderate-income workers do not have sick pay or related benefits that will allow them time off with pay to stay home with their sick child...Productivity is compromised at their jobs, and some may even risk losing their jobs by making their children a priority.”⁴⁵

Of particular concern in healthcare facilities, the lack of sick days also means a temporary employee may work sick and potentially expose patients to illness, rather than lose an assignment that they need to pay bills.

Wage levels. Research done at the Economic Policy Institute found that, nationally, temporary workers were “more likely than regular workers to receive low and poverty-level wages.”⁴⁶ TAP employees earn 5.5% less than permanent workers as a general rule.⁴⁷ Eighty-four percent of those surveyed in 2007 earned between \$10.01 and \$19.99 an hour. The rest were evenly split; 7% made \$10 or less and 7% made \$20-30 an hour.

Public records show the County’s median wage for a direct hire temporary is \$11.30 per hour as of November 2007.⁴⁸ One-quarter make \$10.25 per hour or less, and all the rest make less than \$15.28, which is barely better than the basic wage needed to support a single adult. Assuming a 40 hour week, working 52 weeks a year, the average hourly wage is \$23,504 a year. That pay level does not support a basic needs family budget.

Health Insurance. Our previous work focused on private agency temporary hires, who do not receive health insurance from their assigned workplace, and rarely can afford to buy coverage offered by temporary agencies. Nationally, only 7% of these workers report employer-provided coverage.⁴⁹

The 2007 survey found that only 2% of temporary workers employed by the County had employer coverage. Two-thirds had no health insurance at all, not even through a spouse, 24% were insured through a family member, 6% bought insurance themselves, and 1% did not respond.

It is important to note that medical bills are a serious factor among families filing for bankruptcy.⁵⁰ The lack of insurance, along with the lack of sick days, also means temporary employees are likely to stay sick longer and develop more serious illnesses, which impacts the County as a service provider.

Race and Gender Patterns. Federal census data from 2000 showed a disproportionate hiring of temporary workers along racial and gender lines. African Americans were almost twice as likely to be temporary, 12% versus 7% of the general employed population. Women made up 40% of the permanent work force, but 57% were temporary.

In the Riverside survey, similar trends were repeated and amplified. African Americans are 6% of the County population but made up 23% of temporary employees. Asian Americans make up 4% of the County population but made up 10% of the temporary workforce. Women are 44 % of the workforce population, but made up 76% of temporary employees. The intensification of the national census data trends in the Riverside survey results is cause for concern.

African Americans are 6% of the County population, but made up 23% of temporary employees hired by the County. Women make up 76% of temporary employees, but are 44% of the workforce in Riverside.

8. Factoring the Multiplier Effect

A public agency has the ability to multiply and stimulate economic growth by sustaining good jobs, which allows residents economic security and the ability to spend money in the local economy.

Economists created the term “the multiplier effect” to describe the principle that one individual’s spending is another individual’s income. It provides a useful way to think about job quality. A University of California economist recently noted: “Historically, the measure of economic growth has been job creation. However, the benefits of an economy are realized in consumption.”⁵¹ Therefore, in measuring job quality, one must consider how large a multiplier will be created within the regional economy.

Riverside faces a falling income from retail sales, as people have less income to spend. Husing notes of the Inland Empire retail sector: “Another telltale sign of economic difficulty comes from retail markets. In the fourth quarter, their growth essentially stopped, with rates of 0.0% in San Bernardino County and 0.3% in Riverside County.”⁵²

While the economy is heading in a difficult direction, there is an element of regional economic security in having a government employer as a primary economic driver. Public policy decisions about employment, creating quality jobs in the public sector, can help ensure a region’s economic security.

As the County reacts to the State budget crisis, instead of cutting permanent jobs for a short-term budget adjustment, the County could look at its own job creation as a kind of local “stimulus package.” Providing jobs that allow employees — who are also consumers and residents with families — to accumulate personal wealth and assets will help stimulate and/or stabilize the regional economy.

9. A Multiplying Factor: Home Ownership

Academic findings about homeownership show its importance to community well-being, and indicate that temporary employees are statistically less likely to be homeowners.

Economist Barbara Wiens-Tuers concisely states: “for many households, a home is the most valuable thing they will ever own.”⁵³ Riverside historically has had healthy homeownership rates, prior to the current mortgage crisis. As of 2000, 69% of the county population, or 348,532 families, lived in their own home, while 31%, or 157,686 families, rented.⁵⁴

The recent subprime lending crisis threatens that stability. In January 2008, 3,000 foreclosed homes went to auction in Riverside County.⁵⁵ At the same time, prospective buyers are having a harder time obtaining mortgages above \$417,000, roughly the median home prices in southern California.⁵⁶ Husing has noted that “the new home market saw Riverside County’s sales decline 4.8% to 25,438 units.”⁵⁷ He explains the relation between home values and the local economy.

Assessed valuation is important since property taxes are also a major local revenue source. As of July 1, 2007, San Bernardino County’s net taxable valuation reached \$173 billion, up 15.9% from the year before. Riverside County’s grew to \$234 billion, up 16.8%. Each has benefited from strong residential growth, home price appreciation and strong non-residential construction.⁵⁸

Wiens-Tuers analyzes survey data from baby boomers compiled over a 16 year period. The National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY79) is a data set that followed 12,686 survey participants who were between 14 and 27 years old in 1979.⁵⁹ Among the elements tracked are homeownership and employment. Her findings directly suggest temporary work “is associated with a lower probability of owning a home.”⁶⁰

Home Ownership by Type of Employment⁶¹

	1994 (Ages 29-36)	1996 (Ages 31-38)	1998 (Ages 33-40)
ALL	55.40%	59.95%	63.96%
Type of Employment			
Regular	58.27%	61.69%	66.04%
Agency Temp	41.75%	33.08%	31.18%
In-House Temp	28.38%	50.09%	45.88%
Consultant	61.08%	78.11%	66.13%
Contractor	60.28%	69.61%	66.04%
Employee of Contractor	63.60%	71.63%	58.29%
Other	53.90%	60.19%	64.85%

Source: Barbara Wiens-Tuers, “There’s No Place Like Home,’ The relationship of non-standard employment and home ownership over the 1990s.” *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* Vol. 63., No 4. October 2004.

In this study, two-thirds of “regular,” or permanent, employees owned a home by the ages of 33-40. Not so for temporary employees; only a minority achieved home ownership, with 31.18% of Agency Temps and 45.88% of In-House Temps owning homes. Furthermore, while permanent employees steadily increased in homeownership across the four years, temporary employee homeownership was unsteady, even dropping by over 10% for In-House temps.

There has been no study of homeownership and rental rates among Riverside TAP workers employed by the County. However, the California Budget Project has released a study entitled “Locked Out: the Housing Boom and Beyond.” It compares incomes and costs in counties across the state. It shows that Riverside County residents face a sizable economic obstacle to becoming homeowners. As of August 2007, a Riverside median-priced home was \$390,000 and the annual income needed to buy it was \$94,910. With a median household income of \$53,508, county residents need to increase their incomes by 77%, on average, to afford a house.⁶²

Based on the \$94,910 figure, a household would need combined earnings of \$45.63 per hour (without overtime) in order to afford the median-priced home. Assuming two income earners per household, each making the same amount, 12.6% of the County temporary employee households could afford a home. With three income earners making equal wages, the number rises to just over one-quarter (26.6%) of households. Only the top 6.5% of the County’s temporary workers could afford the median-priced home on individual wages alone.

Homeownership is not only a positive economic grounding for individuals but also has “positive spillovers in the form of increased social capital for communities when residents are homeowners.” This “spill-over” value is more difficult to calculate mathematically. But civic and political engagement are multiplier benefits in terms of community stability, including “the degree to which residents vote and participate in voluntary groups, clubs and sports leagues.”⁶³ UC Riverside Professor Ramakrishnan studied residents’ political civic participation in July 2007, and found that 64% of Inland Empire residents either “somewhat interested” (33%) or “very interested” (31%) in United State politics.⁶⁴

Ramakrishnan also finds 28% of long-term residents—those who have lived in the area 10 years or more—belong to civic organizations. 15% serve as an officer or volunteer in these groups. 17% have attended public meetings, and 32% have signed petitions. Newer residents have not yet caught up. But still 19% belong to civic organizations and 9% serve as an officer or volunteer in these groups. 13% have attended public meetings and 27% signed petitions.⁶⁵

Wiens-Tuers directly links job quality and homeownership to larger the health of communities. “If changing job structures are impacting the ability of some households to own a home, accumulate assets, and increase social capital, this could have important long-term consequences not only for individuals, but their communities as well.”⁶⁶

*Only 12.6% of
Riverside County
temporary employee
households could afford
to buy a home, assuming
two wage earners.*

10. A Dividing Factor: Taxpayer Healthcare Subsidy

Taxpayers subsidize jobs with no healthcare coverage, a reversal of the multiplier effect. People without health insurance have a greater reliance on emergency rather than preventive care. Costs for uninsured children are borne by taxpayers.

We have termed the lack of employer healthcare coverage a “dividing factor,” because it creates the opposite effect from multiplication: employers who do not provide paid health insurance increase financial demands on taxpayers, rather than creating jobs that stimulate consumption and economic prosperity. Since costs for the uninsured are borne by taxpayers, the taxpayers have less money to spend on other things.

Recall that national healthcare coverage for temporary employees was 7%; and two-thirds of respondents to the Riverside 2007 survey had no health insurance of any kind. 2001 estimates counted 319,000 uninsured people in Riverside County.

Medical costs rise for the uninsured largely because they cannot afford to seek preventive care. Low-income county residents delay treatment because of the lack of insurance, and these delays increase treatment costs, a UCLA study has found.⁶⁷ Hospitals then must cover the high cost of treating these patients, who cannot pay their bills. A large portion of these “uncompensated care” costs are paid by taxpayers and by other patients when hospitals raise their rates to fill the gap. In Fiscal Year 2006, uncompensated care cost the Riverside County Regional Medical Center (RCRMC) \$10.6 million, an 86% increase from the previous year.⁶⁸

Much of RCRMC’s funding is from state and federal sources. Costs associated with entitlement programs like Medi-Cal — the national health insurance program for the poor — grow to meet demand. Gross Medi-Cal revenue at the RCRMC, a good indicator of patient volume, increased 57% between 2003 and 2006.⁶⁹ Though currently this cost is borne by the state government, the Governor’s 2008 budget proposal would shift the cost to counties. Either way, the cost is ultimately borne by taxpayers.⁷⁰ The lack of employer-provided healthcare divides rather than multiplies economic benefits from employment.

Two-thirds of Riverside temporary employees surveyed in 2007 said they had no health insurance at all, not even through a spouse.

11. Recommendations: Creating Quality Jobs

Like all public employers, Riverside County has a stewardship responsibility as well as the potential power to make its employees and residents more secure. The State of California should help ensure that county governments encourage the growth of quality jobs, rather than erode regional economies with an overuse of temporary employees.

The Riverside County Auditor/Controller Office promotes three principles in its 2007 audited financial statements: “Stewardship, Compliance and Accountability.” Adherence to these principles clearly requires that fiscal responsibility be more than an annual, line-item financial statement.

This study has shown a number of ways temporary work is similar in the public and private sectors. But there is one fundamental difference: as an elected body, a County government bears a stewardship responsibility. It has an obligation to the taxpaying public to be transparent about its frequency of temporary employee hires versus permanent employee hires. As the largest employer in Riverside County, the County administrators and elected officials must take seriously their ability to create jobs that allow residents to make their own budgets pencil out.

While a temporary workforce is a permanent part of our local economy, there are many things that can be done to improve outcomes for the County, as a place to live and as a service provider.

Recommendations:

- 1. Right to Know: State Audit of County Use of Temporary Employees.** Our case study of Riverside County shows a public agency circumvented the State’s 90-day temporary hire rule by creating an in-house temporary agency. Taxpayers, as both the funders and consumers of public services, have a right to know the volume of temporary workers employed by a public agency, and to help judge whether this volume is excessive. As a funder to its Counties, the State should perform an audit to provide public information on the Riverside County temporary agency.
- 2. Define Parameters of Temporary Employment.** The State Educational Code offers a model for clarifying who is and is not temporary in its definition of temporary employees. The definition includes a statement of legitimate use, transparency procedures including public hearings, as well as limits, reference points for temporary employment duration, and basic principles such as a prohibition on using temporary employees to displace permanent positions. In 2007, State Assembly considered AB 1496 to clarify the use of temporary workers in general law cities and counties to close loopholes permitting hiring of temps for jobs that could be performed by permanent employees. The State should promote AB 1496.
- 3. Ensure Nondiscrimination: Regularly Disclose Gender and Racial Patterns in Temporary Hiring.** Disclosure is a first step in understanding Riverside County’s place in larger trends of disproportionate hiring of temporary workers within racial and gender groups. The State Audit should include examination of race and gender patterns in temporary hiring, with a particular focus on whether there is disparity in converting temporary hires to permanent employees.

4. **Economic Development Department and Inland Empire Counties Re-examine Job Growth Sectors.** The 2004-2014 Inland Empire job growth forecast assumes a continued growth in home development. The drop in new home sales and the subprime mortgage crisis have slowed growth in related industries in the last year. Riverside and San Bernardino Counties need to revisit their economic development strategy to avoid concentrated growth in low-wage industries.
5. **Respect the Right to Collective Bargaining.** Employees have the right to choose an organization to represent them in negotiations with their employer. These negotiations can yield mutually beneficial clarity about the use of temporary employees. Public agencies, including Riverside County, should not spend taxpayer dollars to pressure their employees to reject collective bargaining, or interpret labor relations regulations in a manner that denies temporary workers the opportunity to collectively bargain.

The Center on Policy Initiatives is a Southern California non-profit research and advocacy center dedicated to building a fair economy in which quality jobs with healthcare coverage allow all working people to live with dignity and hope for the future. We envision local government as an open and effective champion for the common good. Our 10 years of research on jobs, affordable housing, healthcare, development projects, and other economic issues provide a foundation for important policy decisions. By analyzing data to determine the impact on working people and communities, CPI produces documentation of the need for change.

Appendix A: Inland Empire Employment by Sector 2006-07

Sector	Sept 07	Oct 07	Nov 07	Nov 06	2006-07 Job Increase	2006-07 Increase	Wage Level
Amusement	17,300	17,200	18,400	17,000	1,400	8.2	Lower
Employment Agency	53,800	53,200	53,840	50,500	2,900	5.7	Lower
Management Professional	61,400	61,400	61,900	58,800	3,100	5.3	Higher
Wholesale Trade	50,600	50,400	50,500	48,000	2,500	5.2	Moderate
Transport Warehouse	62,400	62,900	63,400	60,300	3,100	5.1	Moderate
Other Services	45,400	45,400	45,300	43,200	2,100	4.9	Lower
Health Care	100,400	100,500	100,900	96,400	4,500	4.7	Moderate
Accommodation	18,400	18,600	19,000	18,200	800	4.4	Lower
Eating & Drinking	98,400	98,400	98,900	95,200	3,700	3.9	Lower
Social Assistance	13,700	13,800	13,800	13,300	500	3.8	Lower
Local Government	83,400	83,500	83,600	80,600	3,000	3.7	Higher
Administrative Support	43,500	43,600	43,500	42,000	1,500	3.6	Moderate
Publishing Telecomm other	15,700	15,700	15,800	15,300	500	3.3	Moderate
Retail Trade	176,100	176,600	181,900	176,400	5,500	3.1	Lower
Federal & State Govt.	37,700	37,800	37,600	36,600	1,000	2.7	Higher
Financial Activities	53,700	53,600	53,700	52,300	1,400	2.7	Moderate
Manufacturing	126,800	126,700	126,300	124,000	2,300	1.9	Moderate
Construction	134,100	131,200	128,900	127,500	1,400	1.1	Moderate
Agriculture	14,900	15,500	16,000	15,900	100	0.6	Lower
Utilities	5,700	5,800	5,700	5,700	0	0.0	Higher
Higher Education	13,900	15,900	16,700	16,800	(100)	-0.6	Higher
Education	105,600	107,200	109,000	110,400	(1,400)	-1.3	Moderate
Mining	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,400	(100)	-7.1	Higher

Source: Inland Empire Quarterly Report, January 2008.

Endnotes

- 1 The online encyclopedia Wikipedia notes three sources with different rankings in “California as an independent nation:” the CIA World Fact Book, ranking CA as #10, the California Legislative Analyst’s Office ranking California as #7, and the California Department of Finance ranking California as #8. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_California#endnote_econ
- 2 Department of Human Resources, <http://www.rc-hr.com/>
- 3 “Riverside County to County Community,” <http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/Commute-Maps/RiveCommute.pdf>
- 4 Karthick Ramakrishnan, Ph.D. *Survey of Political and Civic Engagement in the Inland Empire*. UC Riverside Department of Political Science. <http://www.politicalscience.ucr.edu/reports/iesurvey-jul2007.pdf> Page 4.
- 5 Mike Davis, “The Inland Empire,” *Inlandia, a Literary Journey through California’s Inland Empire*. Editor Gayle Wattawa. Heyday Books, Berkeley CA. 2006. Page 424.
- 6 California Budget Project, *Making Ends Meet: How Much Does it Cost to Raise a Family in California?* October 2007. http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2007/0710_mem_003.pdf These regions are based on regions identified by California’s Employment Development Department and the California Economic Strategy Panel, with modest modifications. The basic family budget for each region is based on the average of the costs of the items comprising the basic family budget for the counties, weighted by each county’s population. Housing costs are based on 2007 Fair Market Rents.
- 7 California Budget Project, *Making Ends Meet*, page 3.
- 8 US Census 2000, as cited in *The Economic Impact of the Child Care Industry in Riverside County*, Prepared By The National Economic Development And Law Center <http://www.buildingchildcare.org/CA%20County%20EIRs/Riversidefullreport.pdf> page 14
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 John Husing, Inland Empire Quarterly Economic Report, October 2007 page 5.
- 11 John Husing, Inland Empire Quarterly Economic Report, January 2008, page 3.
- 12 Riverside County Economic Development Agency <http://www.rivcoeda.org/Portals/0/demographicReports/Labor%20Force%20&%20Employment%20Data-Dec%202007.pdf>
- 13 John Husing, Inland Empire Quarterly Economic Report, January 2008, page 3. 53,400 employees listed as working for an Employment Agency in November 2007 do not include temporary employees paid directly by a public agency, as they would be counted in the employment data as Local Government employees. The fact that the largest employer in Riverside County, the County of Riverside, hires temporaries directly means that both the State and Husing’s counts probably underestimate the actual growth and importance of temporary work in the regional economy.
- 14 EDD “Fastest Growing Occupations, 2004-2014, Riverside and San Bernardino Counties.” Listing for Riverside <http://www.labormarketinfo.edd.ca.gov/cgi/databrowsing/?PageID=146>
- 15 John Husing, Inland Empire Quarterly Economic Report, January 2007, page 3.
- 16 *Working on the Margins*, page VI
- 17 A body of academic work on “the New Economy” and globalization has grown since we published our four papers on temporary employment. See for example: Georg Erber & Harold Hagemann: “The New Economy in a Growth Crisis”, in *The New Economy in a Transatlantic Perspective: Spaces of Innovation*, ed. Kurt Hübner, Routledge Studies in Governance and Change in the Global Era , NY: Routledge, 2005. Richard Sennett: *The Culture of the New Capitalism*, Yale University Press, 2006. Joseph E. Stiglitz: *Globalization and Its Discontents*. NY: W.W. Norton, 2002; *The Roaring Nineties - A new history of the world’s most prosperous decade*, 2003; *Making Globalization Work*, 2006. *Low-wage America: how employers are reshaping opportunity in the workplace* .Eds. Eileen Appelbaum, Annette Bernhardt, and Richard J. Murnane. NY: Russell Sage. 2003. *Working and poor : how economic and policy changes are affecting low-wage workers*. Rebecca M. Blank, Sheldon H. Danziger, and Robert F. Schoeni, editors. New York : Russell Sage Foundation, 2006. *Contingent work: American employment relations in transition* edited by Kathleen Barker and Kathleen Christensen. Ithaca : ILR Press, 1998. Parker, Robert E. *Flesh*

peddlers and warm bodies : the temporary help industry and its workers / Robert E. Parker. New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1994. *Flexible employment, contingent work : implications or workers' benefits* Susan Christopherson, Thierry oyelle and Beth Redfield. NY: Conservation of Human Resources, Columbia University, 1990. Martella, Maureen. *"Just a temp.:" expectations and experiences of women clerical temporary workers.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Women's Bureau, 1991. Nonstandard work in developed economies: causes and consequences Eds. Susan Houseman and Machiko Osawa, Mich. : W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2003. *On the job: is long-term employment a thing of the past?* Ed. David Neumark. NY: Russell Sage Foundation, c2000. Autor, David H. *Outsourcing at will : unjust dismissal doctrine and the growth of temporary help* Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000. Vosko, Leah F. *Temporary work: the gendered rise of a precarious employment relationship.* Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 2000.

- 18 EDD Benchmark data for San Bernardino, Ontario and Riverside MSA 1990-2006, Employment Agency # 60-561300
- 19 This is a sub-category of Employment Services. This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in supplying workers to clients' businesses for limited periods of time to supplement the working force of the client. The individuals provided are employees of the temporary help service establishment. <http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/industry/E561320.HTM>
- 20 Auditor Controller Riverside County Annual Financial Report 2007
http://www.auditorcontroller.org/opencms/publications/FinancialPub/cafr/CAFR_2007/CAFR07.pdf
- 21 Stater Brothers employs 6,125 people in Riverside County and 7,600 in San Bernardino County.
- 22 Kaiser employs 3,200 people in Riverside County and 5,682 in San Bernardino County.
- 23 http://www.auditorcontroller.org/opencms/publications/FinancialPub/cafr/CAFR_2007/CAFR07.pdf page 176; <http://www.co.san-bernardino.ca.us/ACR/pdf/cafr/2007%20CAFR.pdf> page 193
- 24 This number differs from the employment numbers released by the Auditor/Controller in the 2007 CAFR.
- 25 Department of Human Resources, Riverside County, "County Highlights, Welcome to Riverside." <http://www.rc-hr.com/CountyHighlights/tabid/195/Default.aspx>. Note the employment numbers are inconsistent with the 2007 CAFR.
- 26 Riverside County Personnel Department memo to the Board of Supervisors, January 11, 1998, page 1.
- 27 Internal Auditor's Report #2004-022 – Human Resources Temporary Assistance Pool (TAP) page 3 http://www.auditorcontroller.org/opencms/publications/FinancialPub/asa-reports/asa-reports/Internal_Auditorxs_Report_2004-022_-_Temporary_Assistance_Pool.pdf
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Riverside County Personnel Department memo to the Board of Supervisors, January 11, 1998, page 2.
- 30 Ibid, page 3.
- 31 Riverside County Human Resources Department Response to Findings and Recommendations
<http://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/grandjury/04resprivcohortap.pdf>
- 32 Riverside County 2008 budget, position summary.
- 33 Such private hires are accounted for in the EDD data for Employment Agency rather than Local Government.
- 34 Public record requests yielded the number of temporary and permanent employees in each County.
- 35 The hire information comes from documents obtained in County public records requests. The pay period lists come from Human Resources.
- 36 2005-2006 Grand Jury Report: Riverside County Department of Mental Health Western Region Older Adult and Adult Services.
http://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/grandjury/grandjury.htm#PAST_REPORTS
- 37 Richard K. De Atley. "Audit details deficiencies at public defender's office." Press Enterprise. May 22, 2007.
http://www.pe.com/localnews/rivcounty/stories/PE_News_Local_D_defend23.3f1e979.html
- 38 Dennis J. Boyle and Marie Whittington. (2003). California Child and Family Services Review System Improvement Plan (SIP) Riverside County. <http://pcwta.sdsu.edu/resources/research-countydata%20docs/RiversideCoSIP.pdf>, on
- 39 Riverside County Regional Medical Center Mission Statement <http://www.rcrmc.org/about/mission.html>
- 40 2005-2006 Grand Jury Report Riverside County Department of Mental Health Western Region Older Adult and Adult Services
<http://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/grandjury/06deptmentalhealth.pdf>

- 41 Response to 2005-2006 Grand Jury Report Riverside County Department of Mental Health Western Region Older Adult and Adult Services <http://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/grandjury/06resdeptmentalhealth.pdf>
- 42 2006-2007 Grand Jury Report: Riverside County Regional Medical Center Mental Health Inpatient Treatment Facility and Emergency Treatment Services Department of Psychiatry. And Response. http://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/grandjury/grandjury.htm#PAST_REPORTS
- 43 Surveys were gathered while measuring support for a “Temporary Worker Bill of Rights” position by staff of the Service Employees International Union.

44 Survey Data by City:

City	# Survey Respondents	City	# Survey Respondents
Banning.....	3	Murrieta	6
Beaumont.....	8	Norco	3
Blythe	1	Oak Hills.....	1
Cabazon	1	Ontario.....	1
Cathedral City.....	5	Palm Desert.....	1
Cherry Hills	1	Palm Springs	2
Chino Hills	1	Perris.....	44
Coachella.....	9	Quail Valley.....	1
Colton	5	Rancho Cucamonga	2
Corona	23	Rancho Mirage.....	1
Desert Hot Springs	5	Redlands.....	5
Fontana	10	Rialto.....	4
Gardenia.....	1	Riverside.....	131
Grand Terrace.....	1	San Bernardino	14
Hemet	30	San Jacinto	13
Highland	4	Sun City	3
Homeland.....	1	Temecula	5
Idyllwild	2	Thermal	2
Indio.....	15	Tustin	1
La Quinta.....	1	Upland	1
Lake Elsinore.....	6	Victorville.....	2
Loma Linda.....	7	Vista	1
Mecca	3	Wildomar.....	1
Menifee	5	Winchester	5
Mira Loma	3	Yucaipa	8
Moreno Valley.....	130		

- 45 Interview Christi Gordon, Vice-President, Market Development Manager—Inland Empire Region and Barbara L. Robinson, Inland Empire Market President, Bank of America. and The National Economic Development and Law Center, June 2005. *The Economic Impact of the Child Care Industry in Riverside County*, page 10.
- 46 Ken Hudson, “No Shortage of ‘Nonstandard’ Jobs,” Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper, Washington, D.C., December 1999. <http://www.rc-hr.com/Employment/TemporaryAssignmentProgramTAP/tabid/393/Default.aspx>
- 47 “Temporary Assistant Program” <http://www.rc-hr.com/dnn/Employment/TemporaryAssignmentProgramTAP/tabid/393/Default.aspx>
- 48 Derived from Riverside County public records, including payroll lists, salary schedules, excluding nurses.
- | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 st Quartile | 2 nd Quartile | 3 rd Quartile | 4 th Quartile |
| \$ 10.25 | \$11.31 | \$15.28 | \$107.02 |
- 49 *Working on the Margins*, page 18.
- 50 *Health Affairs* article summarized in *Consumer Affairs*, “Medical Bills Leading Cause of Bankruptcy, Harvard Study Finds.” February 3, 2005. http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/bankruptcy_study.html
- 51 Bill Watkins, University of California at Santa Barbara Economic Forecast Project. Quoted in the Sacramento Bee, “UC Economists see no recession yet,” 2/4/08 <http://www.sacbee.com/static/weblogs/bythenumbers/010368.html>
- 52 John Husing, PhD, Quarterly Economic Report, January 2008, page 2.

- 53 Wienstuers, page 883.
- 54 US Census Bureau 2000, http://www.rctlma.org/rcd/progress_reports/pr_2007/4-CountyofRiverside.pdf
- 55 *The Desert Sun*, “3000 Riverside County properties sold at auction last month,” February 13, 2008. <http://www.mydesert.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080213/NEWS01/80213007>
- 56 Peter Hong, “Southern California home sales drop to 20-year low.” *Los Angeles Times*. February 13, 2008
- 57 John Husing, Inland Empire Quarterly Economic Report, January 2008, page 3.
- 58 John Husing, Inland Empire Quarterly Economic Report, October 2007, page 4.
- 59 Ibid. 886.
- 60 Ibid. 881.
- 61 Ibid. 888.
- 62 California Budget Project February 2008, *Locked Out: the Housing Boom and Beyond*. http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2008/080212_LockedoutReport.pdf
- 63 Wiens-Tuers page 884.
- 64 Ramakrishnan. page 16. One might assume this number is higher because of the ongoing Presidential election. However, only 51% responded that they were somewhat or very interested in election coverage. Ramakrishnan reports that Riverside’s last Presidential election turnout was 52%, 4% lower than the State average.
- 65 Ibid. page 2.
- 66 Wiens-Tuers page 884.
- 67 E. Richard Brown, et al. “County Residency and Access to Care for Low and Moderate Income Californians.” UCLA Center of Health Policy Research. March 2004. Retrieved from http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/mpi_pb_032004.pdf on February 25, 2008
- 68 OSHPD, Hospital Annual Financial Data, 2005-2006.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 California State Association of Counties <http://www.csac.counties.org/images/public/Advocacy/hhs/HHS%20County%20Impacts%20Chart%20Feb%206%2008.pdf>